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Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant
has a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in strict order of preference. Each
applicant and course has a capacity, indicating the maximum number of courses and
applicants they can be assigned to, respectively. We thus essentially have a many-to-
many bipartite matching problem with one-sided preferences, which has applications
to the assignment of students to optional courses at a university.
We consider additive preferences and lexicographic preferences as two means of
extending preferences over individual courses to preferences over bundles of courses.
We additionally focus on the case that courses have prerequisite constraints: we will
mainly treat these constraints as compulsory, but we also allow alternative prerequi-
sites. We further study the case where courses may be corequisites.
For these extensions to the basic problem, we present the following algorithmic
results, which are mainly concerned with the computation of Pareto optimal matchings
(POMs). Firstly, we consider compulsory prerequisites. For additive preferences, we
show that the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard. On the other hand, in the
case of lexicographic preferences we give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a
POM, based on the well-known sequential mechanism. However we show that the
problem of deciding whether a given matching is Pareto optimal is co-NP-complete.
We further prove that finding a maximum cardinality (Pareto optimal) matching is
NP-hard. Under alternative prerequisites, we show that finding a POM is NP-hard
for either additive or lexicographic preferences. Finally we consider corequisites. We
prove that, as in the case of compulsory prerequisites, finding a POM is NP-hard for
additive preferences, though solvable in polynomial time for lexicographic preferences.
In the latter case, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is NP-hard
and very difficult to approximate.
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1 Introduction
Problems involving the allocation of indivisible goods to agents have gained a lot of at-
tention in the literature, since they model many real scenarios, including the allocation of
pupils to study places [4], workers to positions [23], researchers to projects [30], tenants
to houses [1] and students to courses [11], etc. We assume that agents on one side of the
market (pupils, workers, researchers, tenants, students) have preferences over objects on
the other side of the market (study places, positions, projects, courses, etc.) but not vice
versa. In such a setting where the desires of agents are in general conflicting, economists
regard Pareto optimality (or Pareto efficiency) as a basic, fundamental criterion to be
satisfied by an allocation. This concept guarantees that no agent can be made better
off without another agent becoming worse off. A popular and very intuitive approach
to finding Pareto optimal matchings is represented by the class of sequential allocation
mechanisms [25, 10, 9, 3].
In the one-to-one case (each agent receives at most one object, and each object can be
assigned to at most one agent) this mechanism has been given several different names in the
literature, including serial dictatorship [1, 29], queue allocation [35], Greedy-POM [2] and
sequential mechanism [9, 3], etc. Several authors independently proved that a matching
is Pareto optimal if and only if can be obtained by the serial dictatorship mechanism
(Svensson in 1994 [35], Abdulkadirogˇlu and So¨nmez in 1998 [1], Abraham et al. in 2004
[2], and Brams and King in 2005 [10]).
In general many-to-many matching problems (agents can receive more than one object,
and objects can be assigned to more than one agent), the sequential allocation mechanism
works as follows: a central authority decides on an ordering of agents (often called a policy)
that can contain multiple copies of an agent (up to her capacity). According to the chosen
policy, an agent who has her turn chooses her most preferred object among those that still
have a free slot. This approach was used in [3, 9], where the properties of the obtained
allocation with respect to the chosen policy and strategic issues are studied.
The serial dictatorship mechanism is a special case of the sequential allocation mech-
anism where the policy contains each agent exactly once, and when agent a is dealt with,
she chooses her entire most-preferred bundle of objects. The difficulty with serial dictator-
ship is that it can output a matching that is highly unfair. For example, it is easy to see
that if there are two agents, each of whom finds acceptable all objects and has capacity
equal to the number of objects, and each object has capacity 1, then the serial dictatorship
mechanism will assign all objects to the first agent specified by the policy and no object
to the other agent.
In this paper we shall concentrate on one real-life application of this allocation problem
that arises in education, and so our terminology will involve applicants (students) for the
agents and courses for the objects. In most universities students have some freedom in
their choice of courses, but at the same time they are bound by the rules of the particular
university. A detailed description of the rules of the allocation process and the analysis of
the behaviour of students at Harvard Business School, based on real data, is provided by
Budish and Cantillon [11]. They assume that students have a linear ordering of individual
courses and their preferences over bundles of courses are responsive to these orderings.
The emphasis in [11] was on strategic questions. The empirical results confirmed the
theoretical findings that, loosely speaking, dictatorships (where students choose one at
a time their entire most preferred available bundle) are the only mechanisms that are
strategy-proof and ex-post Pareto efficient.
Another field experiment in course allocation is described by Diebold et al. [15]. The
authors compared the properties of allocations obtained by the sequential allocation mech-
anism where the policy is determined by the arrival time of students (i.e., first-come first-
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served) and by two modifications of the Gale-Shapley student-optimal mechanism, i.e.,
they assumed that courses may also have preferences or priorities over students. More-
over, they only considered the case when each student can be assigned to at most one
course.
In reality, a student can attend more courses, but not all possible bundles are feasible
for her. Cechla´rova´ et al. [13] considered explicitly-defined notions of feasibility for bundles
of courses. For these feasibility concepts, a given bundle can be checked for feasibility for a
given applicant in time polynomial in the number of courses. Such an algorithm may check
for example if no two courses in the bundle are scheduled at the same time, or if the student
has enough budget to pay the fees for all the courses in the bundle, etc. Cechla´rova´ et al.
[13] found out that a sufficient condition for a general sequential allocation mechanism to
output a Pareto optimal matching is that feasible bundles of courses form families that are
closed with respect to subsets, and preferences of students over bundles are lexicographic.
They also showed that under these assumptions a converse result holds, i.e., each Pareto
optimal matching can be obtained by sequential allocation mechanism if a suitable policy
is chosen.
Prerequisites and corequisites
In this paper we deal with prerequisite and corequisite constraints. Prerequisite constraints
model the situation where a student may be allowed to subscribe to a course c only if she
subscribes to a set C ′ of other course(s). The courses in C ′ are usually called prerequisite
courses, or prerequisites, for c. For example, at a School of Mathematics, an Optimal
Control Theory course may have as its prerequisites a course on Differential Equations
as well as a course in Linear Algebra; a prerequisite for a Differential Equations course
could be a Calculus course, etc. On the other hand, corequisite constraints model the
situation where a student takes course c1 if and only if she takes course c2. These courses
are referred to as corequisite courses, or corequisites. For example, a corequisite constraint
may act on two courses: one that is a theoretical programming course and the other that
is a series of corresponding programming lab sessions.
We consider three different models involving prerequisite and corequisite constraints.
The first model involves compulsory prerequisites, but we allow for the possibility that
different students may have different prerequisite constraints. For example, for a doc-
toral study program in Economics, an economics graduate may have as a prerequisite
a mathematical course and, on the other hand, a mathematics graduate may have as a
prerequisite a course on microeconomics, etc. The second model concerns alternative pre-
requisites. Here it is assumed that certain courses require that a student subscribes to at
least one of a set of other courses. For example, a course in mathematical modelling may
require that a student attends one of a range of courses that deal with a specific mathe-
matical modelling software package, such as Maple, MATLAB or Mathematica. Finally,
the third model considers corequisites. Here we assume that constraints on corequisite
courses are identical for all applicants.
As we assume that applicants express their preferences only over individual courses,
a suitable extension of these preferences to preferences over bundles of courses has to be
chosen. Among the most popular extensions are responsive preferences [32]. That is, an
applicant has responsive preferences over bundles of courses if bundle C ′ is preferred to
bundle C ′′ whenever C ′ is obtained from C ′′ by replacing some course in C ′′ by a more
preferred course not contained in C ′′. Responsiveness is a very mild requirement and
responsive preferences form a very wide and variable class. Therefore we shall restrict
our attention to two specific examples, namely additive [5, 9, 11] and lexicographic [17, 5,
34, 33, 36] preferences. Although lexicographic preferences can be modelled as additive
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preferences by choosing appropriate weights [9], we would like to avoid this approach as it
requires very large numbers, moreover, assuming lexicographic preferences from the outset
leads to more straightforward algorithms.
To the best of our knowledge, matchings with prerequisite constraints have not been
studied yet from an algorithmic perspective. Some connections can be found in the litera-
ture on scheduling with precedence constraints [27], but, unlike in the scheduling domain,
there is no common optimality criterion for all the agents, since their desires are often
conflicting and all have to be taken into account.
We would however like to draw the reader’s attention to the works of Guerin et al.
[20] and Dodson et al. [16], who analyse a version of a course selection problem in greater
depth, using probabilistic methods. Their work is a part of a larger research programme
that involves advising college students about what courses to study and when, taking into
account not only the required course prerequisites, but also the students’ course histories
and obtained grades. Based on this information, the authors try to estimate a student’s
ability to take multiple courses concurrently, with the goal to optimise the student’s total
expected utility and her chances of moving successfully toward graduation. Guerin et al.
and Dodson et al. consider also temporal factors, meaning that a student can only take
a certain course in the current semester if she has completed the necessary prerequisites
during previous semesters. By contrast, here we assume that students choose all their
courses as well as their necessary prerequisites simultaneously, and we concentrate on
computational problems connected with producing a matching that fulfils a global welfare
criterion.
Our contribution
As mentioned above, we will formally introduce three possible models of course allocation
involving prerequisites or corequisites. In the first case the prerequisites are antisymmetric
and compulsory (i.e., a constraint might ensure that an applicant can subscribe to course
c1 only if she also subscribes to course c2, but she can attend c2 without attending c1). For
additive preferences we show that computing a Pareto optimal matching is an NP-hard
problem.1 In the case of lexicographic preferences we illustrate that the simple sequential
allocation mechanism and its natural modification may output a matching that either
violates prerequisites or Pareto optimality. Therefore we stipulate that on her turn, an
applicant chooses her most preferred course together with all the necessary prerequisites.
Still, it is impossible to obtain each possible Pareto optimal matching in this way. It is also
unlikely that an efficient algorithm will be able to produce all Pareto optimal matchings,
since the problem of checking whether a given matching admits a Pareto improvement is
NP-complete. Considering structural properties of Pareto optimal matchings, it is known
that finding a Pareto optimal matching with minimum cardinality is NP-hard, even in the
very restricted one-to-one model (naturally without prerequisites) [2], but here we show
that the problem of finding such a matching with maximum cardinality is also NP-hard.
The second model involving alternative prerequisites (i.e., where a constraint takes the
form that an applicant can attend course c1 only if she also attends either course c2 or
course c3) seems to be computationally the most challenging case. We show that although
a Pareto optimal matching always exists, it cannot be computed efficiently unless P=NP,
both under additive as well as lexicographic preferences of applicants.1
For the third case with corequisites (i.e., an applicant can attend a course if and
only if she attends all its corequisites) we propose another modification of the sequential
1This follows because, as we will in fact show, the problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle
of courses for a given applicant in this setting is NP-hard.
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allocation mechanism for finding Pareto optimal matchings. If the corequisites for all the
applicants are the same, the model is closely related to matchings with sizes [7] or many-to-
many matchings with price-budget constraints [13], and we strengthen the existing results
by showing that the problem of finding a maximum size Pareto optimal matching is not
approximable within N1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the total capacity of
the applicants.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give formal definitions of
the problem models and define relevant notation and terminology. Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal
separately with the three different models, involving compulsory prerequisites, alternative
prerequisites and corequisites respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some open
problems and possible directions for future research.
2 Definitions and notation
2.1 Basic Course Allocation problem
An instance of the Course Allocation problem (ca) involves a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an1} of
applicants and a set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn2} of courses. Each course cj ∈ C has a capacity
q(cj) that denotes the maximum number of applicants that can be assigned to cj . Similarly
each applicant ai ∈ A has a capacity q(ai) denoting the maximum number of courses that
she can attend. The vector q denotes applicants’ and courses’ capacities. Moreover ai
has a strict linear order (preference list) P (ai) over a subset of C. We shall represent ai’s
preferences P (ai) as a simple ordered list of courses, from the most preferred to the least
preferred one. With some abuse of notation, we shall say that a course cj is acceptable to
applicant ai if cj ∈ P (ai), otherwise cj is unacceptable to ai. P denotes the n1-tuple of
applicants’ preferences. Thus altogether, the tuple I = (A,C,q,P) constitutes an instance
of ca.
An assignment M is a subset of A × C. The set of applicants assigned to a course
cj ∈ C will be denoted by M(cj) = {ai ∈ A : (ai, cj) ∈ M} and similarly, the bundle of
courses assigned to an applicant ai is M(ai) = {cj ∈ C : (ai, cj) ∈M}. An assignment M
is a matching if, for each ai ∈ A, M(ai) ⊆ P (ai) and |M(ai)| ≤ q(ai), and for each cj ∈ C,
|M(cj)| ≤ q(cj). In the presence of prerequisites and corequisites, additional feasibility
constraints are to be satisfied by a matching, which will be defined below. An applicant
ai ∈ A is said to be undersubscribed (respectively full) in a matching M if |M(ai)| < q(ai)
(respectively |M(ai)| = q(ai)). Similarly we may define undersubscribed and full for a
course cj relative to M .
An applicant ai ∈ A has additive preferences over bundles of courses if she has a utility
uai(cj) for each course cj ∈ C, and she prefers a bundle of courses C1 ⊆ C to another
bundle C2 ⊆ C if and only if
∑
cj∈C1
uai(cj) >
∑
cj∈C2
uai(cj).
Applicant ai compares bundles of courses lexicographically if, given two different bun-
dles C1 ⊆ C and C2 ⊆ C she prefers C1 to C2 if and only if her most preferred course in
the symmetric difference C1 ⊕ C2 belongs to C1. Notice that the lexicographic ordering
on bundles of courses generated by a strict preference order P (ai) is also strict.
Applicant ai prefers matching M
′ to matching M if she prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). We
say that a matchingM ′ (Pareto) dominates a matchingM if at least one applicant prefers
M ′ to M and no applicant prefers M to M ′.
A Pareto optimal matching (or POM for short), is a matching that is not (Pareto)
dominated by any other matching. As the dominance relation is a partial order over M,
the set of all matchings in I, and M is finite, a POM exists for each instance of ca.
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2.2 Compulsory prerequisites
We now define the first extension of ca involving compulsory prerequisites. Suppose that
for each applicant ai ∈ A, there is a strict partial order →ai on the set of courses C
representing the prerequisites of applicant ai. It is easy to see that this partial order can
be fully specified if for each cj ∈ C its immediate prerequisites for ai are given, where
c′j ∈ C is an immediate prerequisite of cj if cj →ai c
′
j and there is no c
′′
j ∈ C such that
cj →ai c
′′
j →ai c
′
j (i.e., →ai is given in terms of its transitive reduction). We now define the
feasibility of a bundle of courses relative to the constraints on compulsory prerequisites.
Definition 1. A bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C is feasible for an applicant ai ∈ A if the
following three conditions are fulfilled:
(i) C ′ ⊆ P (ai) ;
(ii) |C ′| ≤ q(ai) ;
(iii) C ′ fulfils ai’s prerequisites, i.e., for each cj, ck ∈ C, if cj ∈ C
′ and cj →ai ck then
ck ∈ C
′.
A subset C ′ of a partially-ordered set C fulfilling condition (iii) is called a down-set
(see [14]). We shall denote by
→ai
cj the inclusion minimal down-set of C (with respect to
ai’s prerequisites) that contains course cj .
For technical reasons, we assume that
→ai
cj ⊆ P (ai) for each ai ∈ A and each cj ∈ P (ai).
If this is not the case then we can easily modify the preference list of applicant ai either
by deleting a course cj if P (ai) does not contain all the courses in
→ai
cj , or we can append
the missing courses to the end of P (ai).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with (compulsory) PRequisites (capr)
comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P,→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and → is
the n1-tuple of prerequisite partial orders→ai for each applicant ai ∈ A. In an instance of
capr, a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property
that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
In an instance of capr where the prerequisites are the same for all applicants, we may
drop the applicant subscript when referring to the prerequisite partial order →.
2.3 Alternative prerequisites
The second model is a variant of capr in which prerequisites need not be compulsory
but are in general presented in the form of alternatives. Formally, each applicant ai
has a mapping 7→ai : C → 2
C with the following meaning: if cj 7→ai {ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, it
must then hold that if ai wants to attend course cj then she has to attend at least one
of the courses ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik too. For each applicant ai ∈ A the relation 7→ai must be
acyclic in the sense that the graph Gai = (V,Eai) must be acyclic, where V = C and
Eai = {(cj , ck) ∈ C × C : cj 7→ai C
′ ∧ ck ∈ C
′}.
We thus define a bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a given applicant ai ∈ A if
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover, for any course cj ∈ C
′,
if cj 7→ai {ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, then cir ∈ C
′ for some r (1 ≤ r ≤ k).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with Alternative PRequisites (caapr)
comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P, 7→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and 7→ is
the n1-tuple of mappings 7→ai for each applicant ai ∈ A. In an instance of caapr, a
matching M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property that, for
each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
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2.4 Corequisites
In the third and final model we assume that constraints on courses are given in the form
of corequisites. We assume that corequisite constraints are not applicant-specific, and
hence there is a single reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation ↔ on C such that each
applicant is allowed to subscribe to a course cj ∈ C only if she also subscribes to each
ck ∈ C such that cj ↔ ck. Two courses cj , ck ∈ C with cj ↔ ck are said to be each other’s
corequisites. Relation ↔ is an equivalence relation on C and it effectively partitions the
set of courses into equivalence classes C1, C2, . . . , Cr. Hence an applicant can subscribe
either to all courses in one equivalence class or to none.2
Formally, we define a bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a given applicant
ai ∈ A if Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover, for any two
courses cj, ck ∈ C, if cj ↔ ck then cj ∈ C
′ if and only if ck ∈ C
′. An instance I of the
Course Allocation problem with Corequisites (cacr) comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P,↔),
where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and↔ is as defined above. In an instance of cacr,
a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property that, for
each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
We remark that we do not consider corequisites as a special case of compulsory pre-
requisites, nor vice versa, for in the definition compulsory prerequisites, we stipulate that
the order relation is antisymmetric, while for corequisites symmetry is required.
3 Compulsory prerequisites
In the presence of compulsory prerequisites, we consider the case of additive preferences in
Section 3.1 and lexicographic preferences in Section 3.2. It turns out that the problem of
finding a POM under additive preferences is NP-hard, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus the
majority of our attention is focused on the case of lexicographic preferences in Section 3.2.
In that section we mainly consider algorithmic questions associated with the problems of
(i) finding a POM, (ii) testing a matching for Pareto optimality, and (iii) finding a POM
of maximum size.
3.1 Additive preferences
First we show that the assumption of additive preferences in capr makes it difficult to
compute a POM.
Lemma 2. The problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given
applicant with additive preferences in capr is NP-hard.
Proof. We transform from the knapsack problem, which is defined as follows. An in-
stance I of knapsack comprises a set of integers w1, w2, . . . , wn, p1, p2, . . . , pn, W,P . The
problem is to decide whether there exists a set K ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈K wi ≤W
and
∑
i∈K pi ≥ P . knapsack is NP-complete [22].
Let us construct an instance J of capr as follows. There is a single applicant a1
such that q(a1) = W . The set of courses is C ∪ D, where C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and
D = ∪ni=1{d
1
i , d
2
i , . . . , d
wi−1
i }. For each course ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n), its utility for applicant a1
is equal to pi + δi, where δi will be defined shortly. Moreover ci has wi − 1 prerequisites
d1i , d
2
i , . . . , d
wi−1
i . For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ wi − 1), d
j
i has utility ε
j
i for
a1, where the δ and ε values are all positive, distinct and add up to less than 1. They
2This corresponds to the case where each set of courses in Ci can effectively be replaced by a single
supercourse taking up |Ci| places of any applicant it is assigned to – we shall exploit this correspondence
in Section 2.4.
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are selected simply to ensure that a1’s preferences over individual courses are strict. It is
easy to see that in J , a1 has a feasible bundle with utility at least P if and only if I is a
yes-instance of knapsack.
Clearly a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of
courses for a1 can be used to determine whether a1 has a feasible bundle in J with utility
at least P , hence the result.
In the case of just one applicant a1, a matchingM is a POM if and only if a1 is assigned
in M a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses, otherwise M is dominated by assigning
a1 to this bundle. Hence the above lemma directly implies the following result.
Theorem 3. Given an instance of capr with additive preferences, the problem of finding
a POM is NP-hard.
Given the above negative result, we do not pursue additive preferences any further in
this section, and instead turn our attention to lexicographic preferences.
3.2 Lexicographic preferences
3.2.1 Finding a POM
In this section we explore variants of the sequential allocation mechanism, and show that
one formulation allows us to find a POM in polynomial time. This mechanism, referred
to as SM-CAPR, does however have some drawbacks: it is not truthful (see Section 6) and
it is not able to compute all POMs in general.
In the context of course allocation when there are some dependencies among courses
(for instance the constraints on prerequisites in capr) the standard sequential mechanism
might output an allocation that does not fulfil some constraints on prerequisites. On the
other hand, if we require that an applicant can only choose a course if she is already
assigned all its prerequisites, the output may be a matching that is not Pareto optimal.
This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4. Construct a capr instance in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}.
Each applicant has capacity 2 and each course has capacity 1. The prerequisites of both
applicants are the same, and are as follows:
c1 → c3; c2 → c4.
The applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c4, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3, c4
The sequential allocation mechanism with policy σ = a1, a2, a1, a2 will assign to appli-
cant a1 the bundle {c1, c4} and to applicant a2 the bundle {c2, c3}. Clearly, neither of the
assigned bundles fulfils the prerequisites.
Now suppose that in the sequential allocation mechanism an applicant is allowed to
choose the most-preferred undersubscribed course for which she already has all the prereq-
uisites. Let the policy start with a1, a2. Applicant a1 can choose neither c1 nor c2, as these
courses require a prerequisite that she is not assigned yet. So she chooses c4. Similarly,
applicant a2 will choose c3. When these applicants are allowed to pick their next course,
irrespective of the remainder of the policy, a1 must choose c2 and a2 must choose c1. So in
the resulting matching M we have M(a1) = {c2, c4} and M(a2) = {c1, c3}. This matching
is clearly not Pareto optimal, since both applicants (having lexicographic preferences) will
strictly improve by exchanging their assignments.
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Algorithm 1 SM-CAPR
Require: capr instance I and a policy σ
Ensure: return M , a POM in I
1: M := ∅;
2: for each applicant ai ∈ σ in turn do
3: feasible := false;
4: while ai has not exhausted her preference list and not feasible do
5: cj := next course in ai’s list;
6: if cj /∈M(ai) and cj is undersubscribed then
7: S :=
→ai
cj ;
8: feasible := true;
9: for each ck ∈ S do
10: if ck ∈M(ai) then
11: S := S\{ck};
12: else if ck is full then
13: feasible := false;
14: if feasible then
15: if |M(ai)|+ |S| ≤ q(ai) then
16: for each ck ∈ S do
17: M :=M ∪ {(ai, ck)};
18: else
19: feasible := false;
20: return M ;
Therefore we propose a variant of the sequential allocation mechanism, denoted by
SM-CAPR, that can be regarded as being “in between” the serial dictatorship mechanism
and the general sequential allocation mechanism. Suppose a policy σ is fixed; again one
applicant can appear in σ several times, up to her capacity. Applicant ai on her turn
identifies her most-preferred course cj that she has not yet considered, and that she is
not already assigned to (if no such course cj exists then ai is said to have exhausted her
preference list and will be assigned no more courses). If cj is full or ai is already assigned
to cj then ai considers the next course on her list (on the same turn). We then compute
the down-set
→ai
cj of cj (we shall explain how to do this efficiently in the proof of Theorem
5 below). If all courses ck in
→ai
cj satisfy the property that either (i) ck has a free place
or (ii) ck is already assigned to ai, and the number of courses in
→ai
cj not already assigned
to ai does not exceed the remaining capacity of ai, then ai is assigned the bundle
→ai
cj . If
it is impossible to assign bundle
→ai
cj to ai (as signified by the boolean feasible becoming
false) then ai moves to the next course in her preference list until either she is assigned
to some bundle or her preference list is exhausted. This completes a single turn for ai.
The pseudocode for SM-CAPR is given in Algorithm 1. This algorithm constructs
a POM M in a given capr instance I relative to a given policy σ. Notice that serial
dictatorship will be obtained as a special case of SM-CAPR if all the copies of one applicant
form a substring (i.e., a contiguous subsequence) of the policy. We now show that SM-
CAPR constructs a POM and is an efficient algorithm.
Theorem 5. Algorithm SM-CAPR produces a POM for a given instance I of capr and
for a given policy σ in I. The complexity of the algorithm is O(N + n2(L+∆)), where N
is the sum of the applicants’ capacities, n2 is the number of courses, L is the total length
of the applicants’ preference lists and ∆ is the total number of immediate prerequisites of
each course cj in →ai , taken over each applicant ai.
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Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the assignment M produced by SM-CAPR is
a matching in I. Suppose for a contradiction that M is not a POM. Then there exists
a matching M ′ that dominates M . Let A′ be the set of applicants who prefer their
assignment in M ′ to their assignment in M . Define a stage to be an iteration of the
while loop, and for a given stage s, define its number to be the integer k such that s
is the kth iteration of the while loop, taken over the entire execution of the algorithm.
For each aj ∈ A
′, consider the first stage where a course, say cij , was identified for aj
at line 5, such that cij ∈ M
′(aj)\M(aj), and let sj be the number of this stage. Let
ak = argminaj∈A′{sj}.
As cik ∈M
′(ak), all the prerequisites of cik also belong to M
′(ak). Since sk is the first
stage in which a course cik was identified for ak in line 5, such that cik ∈M
′(ak)\M(ak),
all the courses assigned in M to any applicant aj in previous stages also belong to M
′(aj),
for otherwise M ′ does not dominate M . Also, clearly cik /∈ M(ak). Thus it was not the
case that applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at stage sk because ak did not
have room for cik and all of its prerequisites not already assigned to her in M . Rather,
applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at stage sk because at least one course in
→ak
cik , say cr, was already full in M before stage sk. It follows from our previous remark
that in M ′, all the places in cr are occupied by applicants other than ak. Thus cik cannot
be assigned to ak in M
′ after all, a contradiction.
To derive the complexity bound of the algorithm, let us first consider the representation
of the strict partial order →ai of prerequisites for each applicant ai. As mentioned in
Section 2.2, we can assume that the transitive reduction of→ai , representing the immediate
prerequisites of each course, is given as an input to the algorithm. Furthermore, we can
assume that this is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) Dai in adjacency list
form. The first task is to construct the transitive closure of Dai for each ai ∈ A, giving a
DAG D∗ai , again in adjacency list form, from which
→ai
cj , required in line 7, can be returned
as a list in O(n2) time and space, for any course cj ∈ C. The transitive closure of Dai can
be found in O(n2∆ai) time, where ∆ai is the number of arcs in Dai , using standard graph
traversal techniques, meaning that the total time required to compute D∗ai for all ai ∈ A
is O(n2∆), where ∆ =
∑
ai∈A
∆ai .
We next observe that the number of iterations of the for loop in line 2 is O(|σ| = N),
where N is the sum of the applicants’ capacities, whilst the total number of iterations of
the while loop in line 4, taken over the entire execution of the algorithm, is O(L), where
L is the total length of the applicants’ preference lists. At line 5 we assume that the
next course for an applicant ai is maintained by a pointer that initially points to the head
of ai’s preference list, and once the course cj pointed to by ai’s pointer has been found,
the pointer moves on one position (if cj was the last course on ai’s list then the pointer
becomes null, indicating that ai has exhausted her list). Each of the for loops occupying
lines 9-13 and 16-17 has O(n2) overall complexity. Thus the overall complexity of the
algorithm is O(N + n2(L+∆)) as claimed.
The complexity of SM-CAPR is no better than O(N + Ln2) in the worst case, as the
following example shows.
Example 6. Consider a cacr instance in which A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is the set of ap-
plicants and C = {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is the set of courses, for some n ≥ 1. Assume that
each course has capacity 1, whilst each applicant has capacity n and ranks all courses in
increasing indicial order. Also suppose that the prerequisites for each applicant are as
follows:
c1 → c2 → · · · → c2n.
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There are n POMs: in the POM Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ai is assigned the set of courses
{cn+1, cn+2, . . . , c2n} and no course is assigned to any other applicant. Given any policy
σ, let ai be the first applicant considered during an execution of SM-CAPR. When
→ai
c1 is
constructed in line 7, 2n courses are returned; likewise when
→ai
c2 is constructed, 2n − 1
courses are returned, and so on. This continues until
→ai
cn+1 is constructed, leading to the
matching Mi being formed at this while loop iteration. Note that even if the process of
constructing S =
→ai
cj were to halt as soon as |S| > q(ai), the total number of courses
checked at this step of SM-CAPR is still Ω(n2). Similarly, the number of courses checked
at each other applicant’s turn in the policy is also Ω(n2); the only difference being that in
each such case SM-CAPR determines that cn+i is full, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The overall
number of steps used by SM-CAPR is then Ω(n3) = Ω(N + Ln2).
Our next example indicates that in general, SM-CAPR is not capable of generating all
POMs for a given capr instance.
Example 7. SM-CAPR is not able to produce all POMs, even in the case when there are
only two applicants a1, a2 and the capacity of each course is 1. We provide two instances
to illustrate this. In I1 the prerequisites of all applicants are the same. In I2 they are
different, but each course has at most one prerequisite.
In I1, we have C = {c1, c2, c3}, and course c1 has two prerequisites as follows:
c1 → c2; c1 → c3. (1)
Each applicant has capacity 3 and the following preference list: c1, c2, c3.
Depending on the policy, SM-CAPR outputs either the matching that assigns all three
courses to a1, or the matching that assigns all three courses to a2. However, it is easy to
see that the two matchings that assign c2 to one applicant and c3 to the other one are also
Pareto optimal.
In I2, we have C = {c1, c2, c3}. Now the prerequisites of the applicants are different:
c1 →a1 c3; c2 →a2 c3, (2)
Each applicant has capacity 2 and their preferences are as follows:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3 P (a2) : c2, c1, c3.
There are 4 different POMs, as follows:
M1(a1) = {c1, c3}, M1(a2) = ∅;
M2(a1) = ∅, M2(a2) = {c2, c3};
M3(a1) = {c2}, M3(a2) = {c1, c3};
M4(a1) = {c2, c3}, M3(a2) = {c1}.
SM-CAPR outputsM1 with a policy in which a1 is first, and M2 with a policy in which
a2 is first. Notice that neither M3 nor M4 can be obtained by SM-CAPR.
Theorem 3 shows that finding a POM in the presence of additive preferences is NP-
hard. It is instructive to show where SM-CAPR can fail to find a POM in this context,
Example 8. Let I be an instance of capr in which there are two applicants, a1, a2, each
of which has capacity 2, and four courses, c1, c2, c3, c4, each of which has capacity 1. The
prerequisites of both applicants are the same, and are as follows:
c1 → c2; c3 → c4.
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The utilities of the courses for the applicants are as follows:
ua1(c1) = ua2(c3) = 6
ua1(c3) = ua2(c1) = 4
ua1(c4) = ua2(c2) = 3
ua1(c2) = ua2(c4) = 0
Regardless of the policy, SM-CAPR constructs the matchingM = {(a1, c1), (a1, c2), (a2, c3),
(a2, c4)}. M is not a POM as it is dominated by M
′ = {(a1, c3), (a1, c4), (a2, c1), (a2, c2)}.
3.2.2 Testing for Pareto optimality
In the previous subsection we gave a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing a POM
in an instance of capr. It is also reasonable to expect that an alternative approach could
involve starting with an arbitrary matching, and for as long as the current matching M
is dominated, replace M by any matching that dominates it. However, the difficulty with
this method is that the problem of determining whether a matching is Pareto optimal is
computationally hard, as we demonstrate by our next result. This hardness result also
shows that there is unlikely to be a “nice” (polynomial-time checkable) characterisation
of a POM, in contrast to the case where there are no prerequisites [13]. We firstly define
the following problems:
Name: exact 3-cover
Instance: a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , x3n} and a set T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} such that for
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), Ti ⊆ X and |Ti| = 3.
Question: is there a subset T ′ of T such that Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for each Ti, Tj ∈ T
′ and
∪Ti∈T ′Ti = X?
Name: dom capr
Instance: an instance I of capr and a matching M in I
Question: is there a matching M ′ that dominates M in I?
Theorem 9. dom capr is NP-complete even if each course has capacity 1 and has at
most one immediate prerequisite for each applicant.
Proof. Clearly dom capr is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from exact 3-cover,
which is NP-complete [22]. Let I be an instance of exact 3-cover as defined above. For
each Ti ∈ T , let us denote the elements that belong to Ti by xi1 , xi2 , xi3 . Obviously, we
lose no generality by assuming that m ≥ n.
We construct an instance J of dom capr based on I in the following way. The
set of applicants is A = {a1, a2, . . . , am+1}. The capacities are q(ai) = 4 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
and q(am+1) = 2n + m. The set of courses is C = T ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ W , where T =
{T1, T2, . . . , Tm},X = {x1, x2, . . . , x3n}, Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} andW = {w1, w2, . . . , wm−n}.
(Some of the courses in J derived from the elements and sets in I are denoted by identical
symbols, but no ambiguity should arise.) Each course has capacity 1. The preferences of
the applicants are:
P (ai) : Ti, [W ], yi, xi1 , xi2 , xi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
P (am+1) : y1, [X], [W ], y2, . . . , ym
where the symbols [W ] and [X] denote all the courses in W and X, respectively, in an
arbitrary strict order. Recall that {xi1 , xi2 , xi3} ⊆ X (1 ≤ i ≤ m). The prerequisites of
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applicants are:
ai : Ti →ai xi1 →ai xi2 →ai xi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
am+1 : y1 →am+1 y2 →am+1 · · · →am+1 ym
Define the following matching:
M = {(ai, yi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {(am+1, xj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n)} ∪ {(am+1, wk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m− n)}.
We claim that I admits an exact cover if and only if M is dominated in J .
For, suppose that {Tj1 , Tj2 , . . . , Tjn} is an exact cover in I. We construct a matching
M ′ in J as follows. For each k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), in M ′, assign ajk to Tjk and to ajk ’s
three prerequisites of Tjk that belong to X. Let A
′ = {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn , am+1} and let
A\A′ = {ak1 , ak2 , . . . , akm−n}. For each r (1 ≤ r ≤ m − n), in M
′, assign akr to wr.
Finally in M ′, assign am+1 to every course in Y . It is straightforward to verify that M
′
dominates M in J .
Conversely, suppose there exists a matchingM ′ that dominatesM in J . Then, at least
one applicant must be better off in M ′ compared to M .
If am+1 improves, she must obtain y1 and so, due to her prerequisites, all the courses
in Y . This means that each applicant ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) must obtain a course that she prefers
to yi.
Each such applicant ai can improve relative to M in two ways. Either she obtains
in M ′ a course in W , or she obtains Ti. In the latter case then she must receive the
corresponding courses xi1 , xi2 , xi3 in M
′. In either of these two cases, since am+1 cannot
be worse off, she must obtain in M ′ the course y1 and hence all courses in Y .
This means that in M ′ all the applicants must strictly improve compared to M . As
there are only n−m courses in W , there are exactly n applicant in A\{am+1} – let these
applicants be {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn} – who obtain a course in T and its three prerequisites in
X. As the capacity of each course is 1, it follows that {Tjk : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} is an exact cover
in I.
We remark that the variant of dom capr for additive preferences is also NP-complete
by Theorem 9, since lexicographic preferences can be viewed as a special case of additive
preferences by creating utilities that steeply decrease in line with applicants’ preferences
– see [9] for more details.
3.2.3 Finding large POMs
Example 7 shows that an instance of capr may admit POMs of different cardinalities,
where the cardinality of a POM refers to the number of occupied course slots. It is
known that finding a POM with minimum cardinality is an NP-hard problem even for
ha, the House Allocation problem (i.e., the restriction of ca in which each applicant and
each course has capacity 1) [2, Theorem 2]. However, by contrast to the case for ha [2,
Theorem 1] and ca [13, Theorem 6]), the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM
in the capr context is NP-hard, as we demonstrate next via two different proofs. Our
first proof of this result shows that hardness holds even if the matching is not required to
be Pareto optimal.
We firstly define some problems. Let max capr and max pom capr denote the
problems of finding a maximum cardinality matching and a maximum cardinality POM
respectively, given an instance of capr. Let max capr-d denote the decision version of
max capr: given an instance I of capr and an integer K, decide whether I admits a
matching of cardinality at least K. We obtain max pom capr-d from max pom capr
similarly.
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Theorem 10. max capr-d is NP-complete, even if each applicant has capacity 4 and
each course has capacity 1, and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants.
Proof. Clearly max capr-d is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from ind set-d
in cubic graphs; here ind set-d is the decision version of ind set, the problem of finding
a maximum independent set in a given graph. ind set-d is NP-complete in cubic graphs
[19, 28]. Let 〈G,K〉 be an instance of ind set-d in cubic graphs, where G = (V,E)
is a cubic graph and K is a positive integer. Assume that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and
E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. For a given vertex vi ∈ V , let Ei ⊆ E denote the set of edges
incident to vi in G. Clearly |Ei| = 3 as G is cubic.
We form an instance I of max capr-d as follows. Let A be the set of applicants and
let V ∪E be the set of courses, where A = {ai : vi ∈ V } (we use the same notation for the
vertices and edges in G as we do for the courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) Let
the capacity of each applicant be 4 and the capacity of each course be 1. The preference
list of each applicant is as follows:
ai : vi [Ei] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
where the symbol [Ei] denotes all members of Ei listed in arbitrary order. For each vi ∈ V
and for each ej ∈ Ei, define the prerequisite vi → ej for all applicants. We claim that G
has an independent set of size at least K if and only if I has a matching of size at least
m+K.
For, suppose that S is an independent set in G where |S| ≥ K. Let A′ = {ai ∈ A :
vi ∈ S}. We form an assignment M in I as follows. For each applicant ai ∈ A
′, assign ai
to vi plus the prerequisite courses in Ei. Then for each applicant ai /∈ A
′, assign ai to any
remaining courses in Ei (if any). It is straightforward to verify that M is a matching in I.
Also |M | = m+ |S| ≥ m+K, since every applicant ai ∈ A
′ obtains vi and all prerequisite
courses in Ei, and then the applicants in A\A
′ are collectively assigned to all remaining
unmatched courses in E.
Conversely suppose that M is a matching in I such that |M | ≥ m+K. Let S denote
the courses in V that are matched in M , and suppose that |S| < K. Then since |E| = m
and all courses have capacity 1, M ≤ |S|+ |E| ≤ m+ |S| < m+K, a contradiction. Hence
|S| ≥ K. We now claim that S is an independent set in G. For, suppose that vi and vj
are two adjacent vertices in G that are both in S. Clearly (ai, vi) ∈ M and (aj , vj) ∈M .
But since vi and vj are adjacent in G, it is then impossible for both ai and aj to meet
their prerequisites on vi and vj in I, respectively, a contradiction.
Corollary 11. max pom capr-d is NP-hard, even if each applicant has capacity 4 and
each course has capacity 1, and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 10, the matching M in I constructed from an independent
set S in G is in fact Pareto optimal. To see this, let σ be an ordering of the applicants
such that every applicant in A′ precedes every applicant in A\A′. Let M be the result of
running Algorithm SM-CAPR relative to the ordering σ. It follows by Theorem 5 that M
is a POM in I. The remainder of the proof of Theorem 10 can then be used to show that
max pom capr-d is NP-hard.
We now give an alternative proof of Corollary 11 for the case that the constructed
matching is required to be Pareto optimal. This gives NP-hardness for stronger restric-
tions on prerequisites than those given by Corollary 11. Our reduction involves a trans-
formation from the following NP-complete problem [6]:
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Name: (2,2)-e3-sat
Instance: a Boolean formula B, where each clause in B has size three, and each
variable occurs exactly twice as an unnegated literal and exactly twice as a negated
literal in B.
Question: is B satisfiable?
Theorem 12. max pom capr-d is NP-hard, even if each course has at most one pre-
requisite, and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants.
Proof. We firstly remark that, in view of Theorem 9, it is not known whether max pom
capr-d belongs to NP. We show NP-hardness for this problem via a reduction from (2,2)-
e3-sat as defined above.
Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat, where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of variables
and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. We construct an instance I of max pom
capr-d as follows. Let X ∪Y be the set of courses, where X = {x1i , x
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
and Y = {y1i , y
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The courses in X correspond to the first and second
occurrences of vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A ∪ G be the set of applicants,
where A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and G = {g
1
i , g
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity 1.
Each applicant in A has capacity 1, whilst each applicant in G has capacity 2. For each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), define the prerequisite y1i → y
2
i , which is the same for all applicants. For each
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), let x(csj) denote the X-course corresponding to
the literal appearing at position s of clause cj in B. For example if the second position
of clause c5 contains the second occurrence of literal v¯i, then x(c
2
5) = x¯
2
i . The preference
lists of the applicants are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c
1
j ), x(c
2
j ), x(c
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x
1
i , x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
We claim that B has a satisfying truth assignment if and only if I has a POM of size
m+ 4n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in
I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g
1
i , y
1
i ), (g
1
i , y
2
i ),
(g2i , x¯
1
i ), (g
2
i , x¯
2
i ) to M . On the other hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g
1
i , x
1
i ),
(g1i , x
2
i ), (g
2
i , y
1
i ), (g
2
i , y
2
i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), at least one literal in cj is true
under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of cj is true
under f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(c
s
j)) to M . It may be
verified that M is a POM of size m+ 4n in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a POM in I of size m+ 4n. Then the cardinality of M
implies that every applicant is full in M . We firstly show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
either {(g1i , y
1
i ), (g
1
i , y
2
i )} ⊆M or {(g
2
i , y
1
i ), (g
2
i , y
2
i )} ⊆M . Suppose this is not the case. As
a consequence of the prerequisites, if (gri , y
1
i ) ∈ M for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r ∈ {1, 2},
then (gri , y
2
i ) ∈ M . Suppose now that (g
r
i , y
2
i ) ∈ M for some r ∈ {1, 2}, but (g
r
i , y
1
i ) /∈ M .
LetM ′ be the matching obtained fromM by removing any assignee of gri worse than y
2
i (if
such an assignee exists) and adding (gri , y
1
i ) toM . ThenM
′ dominatesM , a contradiction.
Now suppose that y2i is unmatched in M . Let M
′ be the matching obtained from M by
removing any assignee of g1i worse than y
2
i (if such an assignee exists) and adding (g
1
i , y
r
i )
to M (r ∈ {1, 2}). Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction. Thus the claim is established.
It follows that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either g1i is matched in M to two members of X and
g2i is matched in M to two members of Y , or vice versa.
Now create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y
1
i ) ∈
M , set f(vi)=true, otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth
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assignment for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then (aj , x(c
s
j)) ∈ M for some s
(1 ≤ s ≤ 3). If x(csj) = x
r
i for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi) = T
by construction. Similarly if x(csj) = x¯
r
i for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then
f(vi) = F by construction. Hence f satisfies B.
The next example shows that the difference in cardinalities between POMs may be
arbitrary, and that SM-CAPR is not in general a constant-factor approximation algorithm
for max pom capr.
Example 13. Consider a capr instance I in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}
for some n ≥ 1. Let the preferences of the applicants be
P (a1) : c1, c2, . . . , cn P (a2) : cn
and let ci → ci+1 for each applicant (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). Assume that a1 has capacity n,
whilst the capacity of a2 and the capacity of every course is 1.
There are two POMs in I: if SM-CAPR is executed relative to a policy in which a1 is
first then we obtain the POM M1 that assigns all the n courses to a1 and nothing to a2; if
instead a2 is first, we obtain the POM M2 that assigns nothing to a1 and the single course
cn to a2. Hence executing SM-CAPR relative to different policies can give rise to POMs
with arbitrarily large difference in cardinality. It follows that SM-CAPR is not in general
a constant-factor approximation algorithm for max pom capr. However, notice that in
this example the cardinality of the down-set of each course is not bounded by a constant;
enforcing such a condition could improve the approximation possibilities.
4 Alternative prerequisites
In this section we turn our attention to caapr, the analogue of capr in which prerequi-
sites need not be compulsory but may be presented as alternatives. We will show that,
in contrast to the case for capr, finding a POM is NP-hard, under either additive or
lexicographic preferences.
Recall that as capr is a special case of caapr, Lemma 2 implies that finding a most-
preferred bundle of courses under additive preferences is NP-hard. Now we prove a similar
result for lexicographic preferences.
Lemma 14. The problem of finding the most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a
given applicant with lexicographic preferences in caapr is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from vc-d, the decision version of vc, which is the problem of finding
a vertex cover of minimum size in a given graph. vc-d is NP-complete [18]. Let 〈G,K〉
be an instance of vc-d, where G = (V,E) is a graph and K is a positive integer. Assume
that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. We construct an instance I of caapr
as follows. Let the set of courses be V ∪ E ∪ {b} (again, we use the same notation for
vertices and edges in G as we do for courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) There
is a single applicant a1 with capacity m+K + 1 whose preference list is as follows:
P (a1) : b, e1, e2, . . . , em, v1, v2, . . . , vn.
Course b has a single compulsory prerequisite course e1, and each course ej (2 ≤ j ≤
m− 1) has a single compulsory prerequisite course ej+1. Moreover, all the E-courses have
(alternative) prerequisites; namely, for any j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), if course ej corresponds to the
edge ej = {vi, vk} then ej 7→a1 {vi, vk}. We claim that G admits a vertex cover of size at
most K if and only if I admits a matching in which a1 is assigned course b.
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For, suppose that G admits a vertex cover S where |S| ≤ K. Form a matching M by
assigning a1 to the bundle B = {b} ∪E ∪S. Then B is a feasible bundle of courses for a1,
and b ∈ B.
Conversely, suppose I admits a matching M in which a1 is assigned a bundle B con-
taining course b. Then, due to the prerequisites, B must contain all E-courses and for
each course in ej ∈ E, B must contain some course in vi ∈ V that corresponds to a vertex
incident to ej . Let S = B∩V . Clearly S is a vertex cover in G, and as q(a1) = m+K+1,
it follows that |S| ≤ K.
A polynomial-time algorithm for finding the most-preferred bundle of courses for a1
can then be used to decide whether I admits a matching in which a1 is assigned b, hence
the result.
As noted in Section 3.1, in the case of just one applicant a1, a matching M is a POM
if and only if a1 is assigned in M her most-preferred feasible bundle of courses. Hence
Lemma 14 implies the following assertion.
Theorem 15. Given an instance of caapr the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard.
The result holds under either additive or lexicographic preferences.
We finally remark that, since capr is a special case of caapr, Theorem 9 implies that
the problem of determining whether a given matching M in an instance of caapr is a
POM is co-NP-complete for lexicographic preferences (and also for additive preferences
by the remark following Theorem 9).
5 Corequisites
In this section we focus on cacr, the extension of ca involving corequisite courses. As
in the case of capr, we will show that finding a POM in the presence of additive pref-
erences is NP-hard. Thus the majority of our attention is concerned with lexicographic
preferences. In this case we show how to modify the sequential mechanism in order to
obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a POM in the cacr case. Moreover we
show that in cacr, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is very difficult
to approximate.
We begin with additive preferences. A simple modification of the proof of Lemma 2
(ensuring that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ci ↔ d
r
i for each r (1 ≤ r ≤ wi − 1)) gives the
following analogue of Theorem 3.
Theorem 16. Given an instance of cacr with additive preferences, the problem of finding
a POM is NP-hard.
In view of Theorem 16, in the remainder of this section we assume that preferences are
lexicographic. In this case we can find a POM efficiently by dealing with the corequisites
as follows. Let I be an instance of cacr, let σ be a policy in I, and assume the notation
defined in Section 2.4. We lose no generality by supposing that each applicant either finds
all the courses in one equivalence class Ck acceptable, or none of them. Replace all the
courses in Ck by a single supercourse ck such that q(ck) = min{q(cj) : cj ∈ C
k}. For
any applicant ai ∈ A who finds all courses in C
k acceptable, remove all such courses from
ai’s list and replace them by c
k; since preferences are lexicographic, the position of ck in
the modified preference list of ai is the position of the most-preferred course of C
k in her
original list. Let I ′ denote the cacr instance obtained from I by using this transformation.
The sequential mechanism for cacr can be executed on I ′ as follows. The mechanism
works according to a given policy σ in stages. In one stage, the applicant ai who next has
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her turn according to σ chooses her most-preferred supercourse ck to which she has not
yet applied. Applicant ai is assigned to c
k if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) the number of
courses assigned to ai so far plus the cardinality of C
k does not exceed q(ai), and (ii) each
course cj ∈ C
k still has a free slot. If this is not possible, at the same stage ai applies to
her next supercourse until she is either assigned some supercourse or her preference list is
exhausted. Once the whole process terminates, let M ′ be the assignment of applicants to
supercourses in I ′ and construct the following assignment M in I from M ′:
M = {(ai, cj) : ai ∈ A ∧ cj ∈ C
k ∧ (ai, c
k) ∈M ′}. (3)
Let SM-CACR denote the mechanism that constructs M from I and σ. SM-CACR
always yields a POM and runs in polynomial time; the proof is very similar to that of
Theorem 5. In fact we can go a step further and generalise the mechanism to the case of
cacpr, the extension of ca in which there are both prerequisite and corequisite courses
(thus all prerequisites are defined in terms of supercourses). Let us denote by SM-CACPR
the mechanism SM-CAPR with the following modifications:
(i) M should be replaced by M ′ everywhere except in line 20, where M ′ is a matching
of applicants to supercourses;
(ii) every occurrence of “course” should be replaced by “supercourse”; likewise cj (resp.
ck) should be replaced by c
j (resp. ck);
(iii) in line 6, “cj is undersubscribed” should be replaced by “if each course in c
j is
undersubscribed”;
(iv) in line 12, “ck” is full should be replaced by “some course in c
k is full”;
(v) in line 15, |M(ai)| is interpreted as
∑
cj∈M(ai)
|Cj | and |S| is interpreted as
∑
cj∈S |C
j|;
(vi) after line 19, M should be obtained from M ′ as per Equation 3.
We can then arrive at the following result, whose proof is a straightforward extension of
that of Theorem 5 and is omitted.
Theorem 17. Algorithm SM-CACPR produces a POM for a given instance I of cacpr
and for a given policy σ in I. The complexity of the algorithm is O(N+n2(L+∆)), where
N is the sum of the applicants’ capacities, n2 is the number of courses, L is the total length
of the applicants’ preference lists and ∆ is the total number of immediate prerequisites of
each course cj in →ai , taken over each applicant ai.
In the cacr model as defined in Section 2.4, corequisite constraints are common to
all applicants. In this setting, and after the modification described prior to Theorem
17, in which courses are merged into supercourses, cacr becomes equivalent to cap, the
extension of ca with price-budget constraints described in [13]. For an instance I of
cap, it is known that for each POM M in I, there exists a policy σ such that executing
SM-CACR relative to σ produces M [13, Theorem 3]. Our next example presents an
observation about the behaviour of SM-CACR if we extend it to the variant of cacr in
which corequisite constraints are specific to individual applicants.
Example 18. The SM-CACRmechanism can be extended without difficulty to the variant
of cacr (considered in this example only) in which corequisites can be applicant-specific.
However it is no longer true that the mechanism is capable of reaching all POMs relative
to a suitable policy, as we now illustrate. Consider a cacr instance with two applicants
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and three courses. Suppose that each applicant has capacity 2, and that each course has
capacity 1. Assume that the applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3
Assume that each applicant has as corequisites the first and last courses on her list. Then
SM-CACR will return the matching {(ai, ci), (ai, c3)} if the first applicant in the policy is
ai (i ∈ {1, 2}). However the matching M = {(a1, c2), (a2, c1)} is also Pareto optimal and
cannot be obtained by SM-CACR.
Given an instance of cap, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is
NP-hard [13, Theorem 7]. Using the connection between cacr and cap described prior
to Example 18, the same is therefore true for max pom cacr, the problem of finding a
maximum cardinality POM, given an instance of cacr. We now strengthen this result by
showing that max pom cacr is very difficult to approximate.
Theorem 19. max pom cacr is NP-hard and not approximable within a factor of N1−ε,
for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the total capacity of the applicants.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat, where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
is the set of variables and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. Let β =
⌈
2
ε
⌉
and let
α = nβ.
We form an instance I of cacr as follows. Let X ∪ Y ∪Z be the set of courses, where
X = {x1i , x
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, Y = {y
1
i , y
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zD}, where
D = 6n(α − 1) + 1. The courses in X correspond to the first and second occurrences of
vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A ∪ G ∪ {b, h} be the set of applicants, where
A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and G = {g
1
i , g
2
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity 1. Each
applicant in A has capacity 1, each applicant in G has capacity 2, h has capacity 2n−m
and b has capacity D.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), courses y1i and y
2
i are corequisites. Also all the courses in Z
are corequisites. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), x(csj) is as defined in
the proof of Theorem 12. The preference lists of the applicants are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c
1
j ), x(c
2
j ), x(c
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x
1
i , x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (h) : [X]
P (b) : [X], [Z]
In the preference lists of h and b, the symbols [X] and [Z] denote all members of X and
Z listed in arbitrary strict order, respectively. In I the total capacity of the applicants,
denoted by N , satisfies N = D+6n. We claim that if B has a satisfying truth assignment
then I has a POM of size D+6n, whilst if B does not have a satisfying truth assignment
then any POM in I has size at most 6n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in
I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g
1
i , y
1
i ), (g
1
i , y
2
i ),
(g2i , x¯
1
i ), (g
2
i , x¯
2
i ) to M . On the other hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g
1
i , x
1
i ),
(g1i , x
2
i ), (g
2
i , y
1
i ), (g
2
i , y
2
i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), at least one literal in cj is true
under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of cj is true
under f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(c
s
j)) to M . There
remain 2n −m courses in X that are as yet unmatched in M ; assign all these courses to
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h. Finally assign all courses in Z to b in M . It may be verified that M is a POM of size
D + 6n in I.
Now suppose that f admits no satisfying truth assignment. Let M be any POM in
I. We will show that |M | ≤ 6n. Suppose not. Then |M | > 6n and the only way this
is possible is if at least one course in Z is matched in M . But only b can be assigned
members of Z in M , and since all pairs of courses in Z are corequisites, it follows that
M(b) = Z.
We next show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either {(g1i , y
1
i ), (g
1
i , y
2
i )} ⊆M or {(g
2
i , y
1
i ),
(g2i , y
2
i )} ⊆ M . Suppose this is not the case for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). As a consequence
of the corequisite restrictions on courses in Y , y1i and y
2
i are unmatched in M . Let M
′
be the matching obtained from M by deleting any assignee of g1i worse than y
2
i (if such
an assignee exists) and by adding (g1i , y
1
i ) and (g
1
i , y
2
i ) to M . Then M
′ dominates M , a
contradiction.
We claim that each course in X is matched inM . For, suppose that some course x ∈ X
is unmatched. Then let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by unassigning b from all
courses in Z, and by assigning b to x. Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction.
It follows that every course in X ∪ Y is matched in M . Since |X ∪ Y | = 6n and the
applicants in A ∪G ∪ {h} have total capacity 6n, every applicant in A ∪G ∪ {h} is full.
Create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y
1
i ) ∈M , set
f(vi)=true, otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment
for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then (aj , x(c
s
j)) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
If x(csj) = x
r
i for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi)=true by construction.
Similarly if x(csj) = x¯
r
i for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi)=false by
construction. Hence f satisfies B, a contradiction.
Thus if B is satisfiable then I admits a POM of size D+6n = 6n(α−1)+1+6n > 6nα.
If B is not satisfiable then any POM in I has size at most 6n. Hence an α-approximation
algorithm for max pom cacr implies a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether
B is satisfiable, a contradiction to the NP-completeness of (2,2)-e3-sat.
It remains to show that N1−ε ≤ α. On the one hand, N = 6n+D = 6nα+1 ≤ 7nα =
7nβ+1. Hence nβ ≥ N
β
β+17
−
β
β+1 . On the other hand, N = 6nα+ 1 ≥ α = nβ ≥ 7β as we
may assume, without loss of generality, that n ≥ 7. It follows that 7−
β
β+1 ≥ N−
1
β+1 . Thus
α = nβ ≥ N
β
β+17
−
β
β+1 ≥ N
β
β+1N
−
1
β+1 = N
β−1
β+1 = N
1− 2
β+1 ≥ N1−ε.
6 Open problems and directions for future research
We would like to conclude with several open problems and directions for future research.
1. Refining the boundary between efficiently solvable and hard problems. In
the proofs of the NP-hardness and inapproximability results in this paper we had
some applicants whose preference lists were not complete and/or whose capacity was
not bounded by a constant. Will the hardness results still be valid if there are no
unacceptable courses and all capacities are bounded? These problems also call for a
more detailed multivariate complexity analysis. It might be interesting to determine
whether restricting some other parameters, e.g., the lengths of preference lists, may
make the problems tractable.
Other problems for which the computational complexity has not yet been resolved
include the complexity of determining whether a matching is Pareto optimal, given
(i) an instance of cacr, or (ii) an instance of capr where the pre-requisites are the
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same for all applicants (this is not the case in the capr instance constructed by the
proof of Theorem 9).
2. Indifferences in the preference lists. In this paper, we assumed that all the
preferences are strict. If preference lists contain ties, sequential mechanisms have
to be carefully modified to ensure Pareto optimality. Polynomial-time algorithms
for finding a Pareto optimal matching in the presence of ties have been given in
the context of hat (the extension of ha where preference lists may include ties) by
Krysta et al. [26] and in its many-to-many generalisation cat (the extension of ca
where preference lists may include ties) by Cechla´rova´ et al. [12]. However as far as
we are aware, it remains open to extend these algorithms to the cases of capr and
cacr where preference lists may include ties.
3. Strategic issues. By a standard argument, one can ensure that the sequential
mechanism that lets each applicant on her turn choose her entire most-preferred
bundle of courses (i.e., the serial dictatorship mechanism) is strategy-proof even in
the case of prerequisites. However, serial dictatorship may be very unfair, as the first
dictator may grab all the courses and leave nothing for the rest of the applicants.
Let us draw the reader’s attention to several economic papers that highlight the
special position of serial dictatorship among the mechanisms for allocation of mul-
tiple indivisible goods: serial dictatorship is the only allocation rule that is Pareto
efficient, strategy-proof and fulfils some additional properties, namely non-bossiness
and citizen sovereignty [31], and population monotonicity or consistency [24]. We
were not able to obtain a similar characterization of serial dictatorship for capr.
As far as the general sequential mechanism is concerned, a recent result by Hosseini
and Larson [21] shows that no sequential mechanism that allows interleaving policies
(i.e., in which an ai is allowed to pick courses more than once, and between two turns
of ai another applicant has the right to pick a course) is strategy-proof, even in the
simpler case without any prerequisites. It immediately follows that SM-CAPR is not
strategy-proof. However, it is not known whether a successful manipulation can be
computed efficiently. Further, we have shown that in capr, not all POMs can be
obtained by a sequential mechanism. We leave it as an open question whether a
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal mechanism other than serial dictatorship exists
in capr.
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